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Abstract
The credit union supervisory committee, as a distinct
model of organisational oversight, is very much
invisible within corporate governance research. The
focus is almost entirely on its corporate counterpart,
the audit committee. This means that best practice is
based almost entirely on audit committee experience,
even though the audit committee model has not always
prevented large-scale corporate losses. Audit
committee and corporate and co-operative governance
literature may benefit from the perspective of
alternative models, such as that of the credit union
supervisory committee. 
This paper explores the role of the supervisory
committee in credit union governance and the
structure of supervision, oversight and regulation
within the Irish credit union movement. It reports the
findings of a survey of credit union supervisory
committees and qualitative interviews with key players
in credit union supervision and development in
Ireland, including the regulators of the credit union
movement. A profile of the composition, activities and
skills levels of supervisory committees is examined.
The findings show that it is the high level of activity of
the supervisory committee and its clear-cut
independence that set it apart from other
organisational oversight models. 
Key words
Audit Committees, Credit Unions, Governance,
Regulating Financial Services, Supervisory Committees.
Introduction
The credit union supervisory committee, as a model of
organisational oversight, is very much invisible within
corporate governance research, where the focus is
almost entirely on its corporate counterpart, the audit
committee. Thus, best practice is based almost entirely
on audit committee experience. This is despite the
existence of over 40,000 successful credit unions
worldwide, safeguarding US$600 billion in member
savings under the supervision of credit union
supervisory committees. 
Given the changing nature of regulation of credit
unions in Ireland, the role and value of the supervisory
committee is coming under increased scrutiny,
particularly as a result of its increased importance
under the 1997 Credit Union Act. In the Republic of
Ireland (RoI) alone, there are over 400 credit unions
with ?7 billion in member savings, and all credit unions
are required by legislation to elect from their
membership a supervisory committee charged with
‘the general duty of overseeing the performance by the
directors of their functions’ (Credit Union Act 1997,
S.58 (1)). The Irish Financial Services Regulatory
Authority (IFSRA)1 has expressed the view that credit
union supervisory committees should develop along
the lines of the audit committee model. With the
abundance of research and best practice guidelines on
audit committees, compared with little or no research
on supervisory committees, this is hardly surprising.
Therefore, the authors are of the view that it is
important to examine the value of the supervisory
committee model before any drastic changes are made
to its structure and practices. 
This paper explores the role of the supervisory
committee in credit union governance and presents a
comparison with the audit committee model. It
reports the findings of a survey of credit union
supervisory committees and qualitative interviews
with key players in credit union supervision in Ireland.
In order to compare the audit committee and
supervisory committee models, the authors draw on
past audit committee research. It is hoped that this
paper will be a useful starting point for further
research into the Supervisory Committee model of
organisational oversight while also presenting an
alternative model to that of the audit committee in
corporate governance literature.
The corporate audit committee
The corporate audit committee is an internal control or
monitoring body in an organisation. According to
Collier (1997:74), they have ‘responsibility for
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reviewing the financial statements and the accounting
principles and practices underlying them, liaising with
the external and internal auditors, and reviewing the
effectiveness of internal controls’. The audit committee
is now recognised has having a central role to play in
good corporate governance. This has led many of the
corporate governance guidelines and codes such as
those produced by Cadbury (1992), Higgs (2003) and
Smith (2003) to focus on strengthening the role of the
audit committee. 
The Irish Companies (Auditing and Accounting) Bill
(2003) requires all public companies (whether listed or
not) and all large private companies to have an audit
committee (Devlin, 2003:25). Much of the corporate
governance literature also focuses on audit
committees. The following quotes give a flavour of
some of the views in the literature: 
‘One of the many lessons from the still unfolding
Enron scandal is the critical role of audits and
the trouble that can befall an organisation when
its audit committee is not doing its job’. 
Reed (2002, p40)
‘Recent events in the U.S. economy have
organisations scrambling to ensure they have all
the right pieces in place to avert financial
disaster. Many are discovering that one of the
most important is a strong audit committee’.
Verschoor (2002, p26)
The audit committee model, however, has not
prevented recent corporate losses (such as those in
Barings, Enron, AIB/First Maryland). Some observers
(Sweeney 2002; Spira 1999; Collier 1997) refer in
particular to its lack of independence as a key factor in
the weaknesses of this committee. Most literature and
corporate governance reports grapple with the notion
of independence and rarely make clear
recommendations in this regard. On one hand,
independence is seen as essential to effective
oversight (Verschoor 2002; Spollen 1997), while on the
other, it is viewed as potentially damaging, where
separation between the board and audit committee
might result in difficult tensions within the
organisation (Smith 2003). 
The 1992 Cadbury Committee, in reporting on
corporate governance, defined audit committee
independence as being ‘freedom from company
connection or relationship which might interfere
with the exercise of independent judgement’ (Spira
1999:263). In corporate companies, the audit
committee operates as a sub-committee of the board
and is comprised of non-executive directors. In this
respect, the board can exercise some control over
the audit committee and can decide who its members
are. The members of the audit committee, as non-
executive directors, can also participate in corporate
decision-making. It is this ‘blurred distinction’ (Smith
2002:25) between roles that often causes confusion
and lack of trust among shareholders and
undermines responsibilities. 
Another weakness raised is the level of relative
inactivity of many audit committees, where they only
meet four times per annum, which as Healy and Palepu
(2002) suggest, translates into only a few hours in the
year. Our findings later show that credit union
supervisory committees meet regularly, with many
meeting on a weekly basis. 
Healy and Palepu (2002) also criticise audit
committee members for their often modest
background in finance and accounting. DeZoort
(1997), in a review of relevant literature, states that:
‘Findings in this area indicate that, while
expertise and experience in oversight areas are
perceived as critical components of overall
committee effectiveness, they are lacking for
many audit committee members.’ 
DeZoort (1997, p213)
Sweeney (2002,) confirms the earlier findings by
DeZoort (1997).
‘Audit committee ineptitude, in particular, is
generally acknowledged to be among the
principal reasons why shareholders suffered
billions of dollars in losses over the last year or so’.
(Sweeney,2002, p16) 
Smith (2003) states that at least one member of the
audit committee must have
‘significant, recent and relevant financial
experience…It is highly desirable for this member
to have a professional qualification from one of
the professional accountancy bodies’. 
(Smith, 2003, p9)
Smith goes on to state that there should be an
induction programme for new committee members
and that training should be provided to all audit
committee members on an on-going and timely basis.
These sentiments are echoed in the Higgs Report
(2003). So while active, experienced and trained audit
committees are now seen as an essential element of
good governance in corporate companies, the jury is
largely still out with regard to the operational definition
of independence. 
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The credit union supervisory committee
The supervisory committee in a credit union has a similar
function to that of an audit committee. In Irish credit
unions, it is a statutory committee, established by the
Credit Union Act (Republic of Ireland) 1997. It is elected
from among the members of the credit union, by the
members of the credit union, and is responsible to the
credit union membership. The committee consists of
three or five members, all of whom work in a voluntary
capacity and represent the interests of the general
membership. The primary function of the committee is
to oversee the performance of the credit union directors.
The Supervisory Committee normally attends all board
meetings but does not participate in decision-making.
Thus, its independence from the board is secured.
Supervisory committees came into being at an early
stage in credit union development, as early as the
Raiffeisen movement of the late 1800si. Possibly one of
the reasons Irish credit unions adopted the idea of a
supervisory committee was because the agricultural
credit societies and village banks failed in the early
1900s partly as a result of ‘inadequate control
procedures’ (Quinn, 1999:13). It seems credit unions
were intent not to repeat the same mistakes.
The supervisory committee, as an independent
entity, seems to be the most popular model of
organisational oversight used in credit union
movementsii. As indicated earlier, the credit union
supervisory committee model does not appear to have
played any role in the development of corporate
governance theory or practice. Even within credit
union circles, there is little focus on supervisory
committees. However, within the corporate sector,
audit committees are now seen as a key ingredient in a
good corporate governance structure. 
Credit union governance structure
Individual credit union 
The governance structure in a credit union is
comprised of four main elements: the membership at
the AGM, the board of directors, the supervisory
committee and the salaried management. As Figure 1
below depicts, the supervisory committee performs
the pure oversight role in the credit union. 
The key issue in governance is that in most
organisations, including credit unions, there is a degree
of separation between those who own the organisation
and those who manage the organisationiii. Thus, there
must be an oversight function of some sort in
organisations to ensure that management always acts
in the interests of the owners. In corporate companies,
this role is performed by the non-executive directors
and the audit committee. In credit unions, the board of
directors perform an executive, and to a lesser extent,
an oversight function. The supervisory committee in
the credit union performs a pure oversight role. 
Membership (at AGM)
Board of Directors
(Policy and Direction)
Manager
(Daily management of 
the credit union staff)
Elects
Elects
Oversees
Oversees/works in partnership with the manager
Supervisory 
Committee
(Oversight)
Figure 1 Corporate Governance Structure in Credit Unions. Adapted from Branch & Baker, 2001
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The role of the supervisory committee within the
overall regulation of credit unions is as an internal
regulator.
Credit union movement
There is a number of layers of supervision and
oversight in the credit union movement. The ultimate
supervisory authority is IFSRA, which, as a result of
intense lobbying by the Irish League of Credit Unions
(ILCU)iv, has a dedicated Registrar of Credit Unions to
regulate credit unions. The ILCU also acts as a
monitoring body. It employs a number of field officers
who visit credit unions and monitor their books and
operations. (The precise monitoring role the ILCU will
play into the future is unclear at the present time, as it
may be taken over by IFSRA.)
The regulatory structure is presented
diagrammatically in Figure 2.
The research
The research conducted consisted of both a
quantitative and qualitative research methodology.
The quantitative element comprised of a survey
with 125 supervisory committee members from 39
Irish credit unions. These surveys were
administered face to face and focused on the
composition of the committee. The authors draw a
comparison with the audit committee model in
terms of compositional factors. The qualitative
element of the study involved interviews with a
number of key witnesses who are involved in credit
union supervision, development and regulation.
These interviews focus on the key issues of the role
of the supervisory committee, skills required by
supervisors and on whether the committee should
remain fully independent or develop along the lines
of the audit committee model. 
Findings – Survey
A profile of the individual supervisor in terms of age
and gender is first presented. This is then followed by
aggregated data on the committee as whole, in terms
of composition. 
General profile of the individual supervisor
The research presents an overall profile of the
individual who volunteers their time to the credit
union as a supervisor. The most striking characteristic
is that supervisors tend to be male and over 44 years of
age (See Figure 3). The numerical dominance of males
on supervisory committees was also found by McKillop
et al (2002).  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MEMBERS
Credit Union Organisation
Supervisory
Committee
Board of 
Directors
External
auditors
Registrar of
Credit Unions
ILCU Monitoring
(future monitoring role 
of ILCU is unclear)
IFSRA
Figure 2 Credit Union Supervision
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Figure 3 Profile of individual supervisor
Thus, it could be suggested that for regeneration
and for representational purposes, supervisory
committees should attempt to have greater balance in
their membership. 
Committee composition
In order to determine the committee composition, we
aggregated the data and examined each supervisory
committee. The results are present in Table 1. While
the Table only focus on the supervisory committee, we
compare the results with audit committee research and
suggested best practice. Table 1 indicates that credit
union supervisory committees are numerically
dominated by male members. As the authors are not
aware of any gender research on corporate audit
committees, it was not possible to make a comparison
between the supervisory committee and the audit
committee on this factor. 
In terms of length of service on the committee, 82%
of committees have one or more members in at least
their second term of service. This suggests a strong level
of experience on these committees. 18% of committees
are in their first term. It could be suggested that these
committees are inexperienced and have the
disadvantage that they lack the guidance of more
experienced members. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000)
point out that committees must consider both
continuity and the desirability of fresh perspectives for
their development. They state that ‘rapid turnover can
be detrimental to the committee’s effectiveness’ since
members need time to gain experience and the benefit
of a historical perspective. 
Eighty percent of the surveyed supervisory
committees consist of members with previous credit
union experience in some other capacity, as board
member, sub-committee member, or staff member.
This is a positive finding given that a good
understanding of the business is essential to the
effective operation of a supervisory committee. It is
also interesting to note that 90% of committees have at
least one member with relevant supervisory committee
training. It is interesting to compare this with training
provided for audit committees. 
The American Society of Corporate Secretaries
(ASCS), in its 1998 survey on audit committee
effectiveness, found that only 6% of 550 public
companies provide formal training to their audit
committee members. The ILCU runs specific courses
for supervisory committee members. 64% of
supervisory committees surveyed have at least one
member with accounting experience and/or
qualifications. Smith (2003) recommends that there
should be at least one member who is financially
literate on the corporate audit committee. The
aforementioned audit committee survey carried out by
the ASCS found that 74% of respondents had at least
one audit committee member who had a finance or
accounting background (PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
2000). The credit union supervisory committee, at
64%, compares less favourably.
The research found that all the supervisory
committee members work on a voluntary basis. This
differs significantly from the corporate audit
committee which is remunerated for its time.
Supervisory committee members must be members
of the credit union and must not hold a directorship
or be an employee of the credit union. This helps to
ensure independence and objective judgement.
This differs from the audit committee where
directors (independent and not) can be members of
the audit committee. All the supervisory
committees studied were elected by the
membership of the credit union and are an
independent entity from the board of directors. This
differs from the audit committee selection methods.
The Public Company Governance Survey (1999-
2000) carried out by the National Association of
Corporate Directors found that in 41% of companies
the audit committee members are chosen by the full
board and in 35% are chosen by the CEO and/or the
board chair (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2000). 
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Activity level of the committee
Supervisory committees meet approximately 40 times
or more in the year to carry out on-going spot checks
on the general operations of the credit union. In
addition to these meetings, supervisory committees
are required to meet four times a year with the board,
in the absence of salaried management, to report on
the performance of the board. In contrast, the
corporate audit committees normally meet on a
quarterly basis. They also attend all monthly board
meetings. It might be argued that twelve board
meetings, versus four audit committee meetings, might
well leave non-executive directors with a greater sense
of their duties on the board rather than their
responsibilities as audit committee members.
Unlike corporate audit committees, supervisory
committees are observers at an operational as well as a
strategic level in credit unions. This ensures that they
are close to the everyday, operational activities of the
credit union, are familiar with the staff members and
can build positive relationships with management.
They also attend all board meetings as observers and
can easily be familiar with decisions made and the
rationale behind them, while retaining the committee’s
independence. The on-going interaction at both of
these levels of the organisation may enable supervisory
committees to recognise and deal with a potential
difficulty or issue early and before they can develop
into more serious problems. 
In reporting to the board, the supervisory committee
can make recommendations to the board for improving
performance. While these are not binding, they are also
a useful measure of committee activity. Figure 4 shows
the level of activity of supervisory committees in terms
of recommendation-making.
Figure 4, Supervisory committee recommendation-
making to the board
The majority (67%) of the studied supervisory
committees make recommendations to the board.
However, a significant 33% claim not to make
recommendations. Why do some committees make
recommendations and others do not? To attempt to
answer this, we cross-tabulated supervisory committee
composition with the tendency to make
recommendations to the board. The results of these
cross-tabulations are presented in Table 2. 
While none of the above results are significant at the
p< 0.05 level, there would appear to be a slightly
greater tendency for those committees which are male
dominated, those with longer serving members and
those with previous credit union experience to be
more active in making recommendations to the board.
Supervisory Committee Composition 
Gender
• All/majority male
• All/majority female
78%
22%
Length of Service
• All members in their 1st term (3 years and less)
• At least one or more members in their second
term or more
18%
82%
Previous CU experience
• No previous credit union experience on the 
committee
• At least one or more members with previous 
credit union experience
20%
80%
Participation in relevant supervisory committee
training
• No supervisory committee training received by the
committee
• At least one or more members who have 
participated in supervisory committee training
10%
90%
Formal accounting experience and/or
qualifications
• No formal accounting experience and/or 
qualifications  
• At least one or more members on the committee 
with accounting experience and/or qualifications
36%
64%
Remuneration 
• All supervisory committee members work on a 
voluntary basis
100%
Independence of the committee
• All members of the supervisory committee are 
elected by the membership (shareholders) of the 
credit union.
• There are no credit union directors, employees or 
other credit union committee members on the 
supervisory committee
100%
100%
Table 1, Compositional Profile of Supervisory
Committees
It is important to remember that the sample size was
small, being only 39 credit unions. An extension of the
sample size in future research may alter the statistical
significance of the findings.
The findings of the survey indicate that the credit
union supervisory committee composition and
structure compares favourably with the best practice
guideline set out for audit committees. In some cases
the supervisory committee outperforms the audit
committee, particular in terms of its level of activity,
independence and participation in specific training.
However, it compares less favourably in terms of
financial expertise. The next section of this paper will
examine the views of a number of key witnesses from
the credit union movement, including the financial
regulatory body (IFSRA).
Findings – Key witness interviews
Ten key witnesses were interviewed from the following
organisations: ILCU, Credit Union Development
Association (CUDA), IFSRA, former Registrar of
Friendly Societies, Credit Union Supervisors’ Forum as
well as other individuals who are deeply involved in the
work of supervisory committees. 
The interviews covered a number of areas, including
the role and perceived skills of supervisory committees
and the independence of the supervisory committee.
Role of the supervisory committee 
Many of the key witnesses felt that there was often
confusion in the minds of both the supervisory
committee and the board of directors about their
respective roles. The general agreement was that the
supervisory committee must confine its role to
oversight only. A quote from one of the key witnesses
summarises this point:
“Supervisory committees do not have any role in
the running of the credit union, they cannot
influence board decision making, cannot voice
an opinion, but can make a point of order/or a
point of information…supervisory committees
must know how far they can go and must not go
beyond this point.”
One other key witness stated that 
“on occasions, supervisors become involved in
policy making and that this causes tension
and problems in the credit union”. 
Another key witness indicated that the supervisory
committee and the board often only become aware of
supervisors’ roles when there is a difficulty in the credit
union –“from this comes more understanding and
possibly respect from the board about the role of the
supervisory committee”. If this is the case, it is
unfortunate that the credit union has to experience
some turbulence before the role of the supervisory
committee is fully recognised.
Skills required 
The key witnesses were in general agreement about
the important skills required on a supervisory
committee. These are listed as follows in the general
order of importance: 
1. Common Sense
2. Human resources or people skills
3. Financial skills
4. Independence, sound judgement and the ability to
ask constructive questions
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Supervisory Committee Composition 
Committees
which make
recommend
ations to
the board
of directors
Chi Square
Result
P< 0.05
Gender
• All/majority male
• All/majority female
21 (72%)
4 (44%)
.122
Length of service on committee
• All members in their first term (3 yrs or
less)
• At least one or more members in their
second term or more
3 (43%)
23 (72%)
.140
Participation in supervisory committee
training
• None of the members have participated
in supervisory committee training
• At least one or more members have
participated in supervisory committee
training
2 (50%)
24 (69%)
.455
Previous credit union experience
• No previous credit union experience on
the committee
• At least one or more members with
previous credit union experience
4 (50%)
22 (71%)
.262
Formal accounting experience and/or
qualifications
• No accounting experience and/or
qualifications
• At least one or more members with
accounting experience and/or
qualifications
9 (64%)
17 (68%)
.813
Table 2, Cross-tabulations of supervisory committee
composition and recommendation-making to the board
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5. A clear understanding of roles
6. The ability to view the overall picture and not
simply focus on the routine aspect of their work 
Almost all key witnesses felt that supervisors need
common sense primarily, and then specialised
knowledge. A quote from one key witness summarises
that view:
“A supervisory committee can have all the
financial skills and qualifications but if it does
not have common sense and people skills then
this committee will not be effective.”
However, in saying that, many of the key witnesses
highlighted that a major shortcoming in many
supervisory committees is a lack of financial
knowledge. It was also suggested by some of the key
witnesses that supervisory committees may have a
tendency to over-focus on certain elements of their
work while ignoring other areas. Spollen (1997)
alludes to this tendency when he says that sometimes
the internal control function in a company tends to
over focus on the areas known best and on simpler
routine tasks while ignoring the more complex areas
of the organisation. One key witness summarises this
point as follows:
“Some supervisors will put all their effort into
balancing the bank reconciliation down to the
last cent. When the organisation has assets of
several million, supervisors must be able keep
their work in context and see the overall picture.”
Supervisory committee as an independent
entity
Some of the key witnesses feel that the supervisory
committee, as an independent entity, can create
tension in credit unions. These key witnesses feel that
the committee should become a sub-committee of the
board similar to the audit committee in corporate
companies. 
In Ireland, the statutory independence of the
supervisory committee has, in fact, increased. In the
Credit Union Act 1966, one director could sit on the
committee. The 1997 Credit Union Act changed this to
ensure that no director could be a member of the
committee. It was felt by the drafters of the 1997 Act
that a supervisory committee which contains directors
‘defies logic’ in that it does not make sense for a board
director to be responsible for reviewing board
performance. 
While the Irish legislation is strengthening the role of
the supervisory committee, other credit union
legislation from around the world would appear to
have weakened the role of the supervisory committee.
Of 104 summary credit union legislations from around
the world, only 10 mention the supervisory committee.
While this may be so, the World Council of Credit
Unions (WOCCU) has kept the concept of the
independent supervisory committee to the fore in its
model law for credit unions. 
Should the supervisory committee remain an
independent entity or should it be a sub-committee of
the board? The view from the majority of the key
witnesses was that the supervisory committee should
remain independent of the board. Many felt that this
independence was the key to its effectiveness. It was
felt that this independence would only result in
tensions between the board and the supervisory
committee if both parties were unclear of their roles
and responsibilities. Perhaps the real issue underlying
that of independence is clarity of role. 
In the corporate governance codes and literature,
there appears to be a pre-occupation with the
importance of independence, although precise
definitions are not always forthcoming. Spira (1999)
indicates that substantial emphasis is placed on
independence in Cadbury (1992), which she says
implies that “independence is a prerequisite for ethical
behaviour in the context of corporate governance”. In
fact, Higgs (2003), Smith (2003) and also Cadbury
(1992) recommend that at least half of the board
should be made up of non-executive directors.
However, the non-executive directors also sit on the
board and are involved in decision-making. This has led
a number of commentators (Spira 1999, p263, Collier
1997, p80) to highlight the conflict for the non-
executive director in trying to carry out a decision-
making role and a monitoring role at the same time.
Spira (1999, p263) has indicated that the corporate
governance codes have not sufficiently dealt with this
dilemma. O’Higgins (2003, p32) highlights that this
may result in a ‘latent threat’ to the unitary nature of
the board. 
Under the Stock Exchange’s Combined Code, non-
executive directors on an audit committee should be
‘independent of management and free from any
business or other relationship would could materially
interfere with the exercise of their independent
judgement’. However, because the audit committee is
a sub-committee of the board and its members
therefore also sit on the board, independence can be
difficult. Vicknair, Hickman and Carnes (cited in Collier
1997) have raised doubts about the impartiality of
‘grey’ area directors, who are ‘not wholly independent
of management’ and who may undermine the position
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of audit committees as ‘truly independent corporate
governance entities’. 
Thus, if independence and impacts on the unitary
board are issues in corporate companies, perhaps it is
better to have a group separate to the board who, if
carrying out their role in an effective and clearly
understood way, are truly independent and do not
affect the unitary function of the board. 
Conclusions
The supervisory committee model may well be a useful
alternative model to the corporate audit committee
model for organisational oversight. Its clear and
unequivocal independence from the board overcomes
one of the main, widely recognised shortcomings of
the corporate model. The high level of activity of the
Supervisory Committees surveyed challenges the so-
called cavalier approach of many audit committees.
This can be explained, at least in part, by the prior
experience and regular training of committee
members, factors which are deemed to be important in
the literature, as well as the clear understanding of
their role. It might also be accounted for by the fact
that committee members receive no remuneration to
fulfil their duties, which may indicate a commitment to
the organisation and its members that goes beyond any
pecuniary interest. 
The supervisory committees surveyed are not
without their faults. Their numerical dominance by
males must be addressed. Their weakness relative to
audit committees in terms of financially qualified
members must also be tackled through revised
recruitment and professional training strategies. As
already indicated, this research was restricted by the
lack of literature on credit union supervisory
committees and credit union regulation. It is also
limited in that it does not delve into the many complex
issues which impact on supervisory committees, such
as the psychological dynamics between the committee
and the board/management, the issue of volunteer
commitment to credit unions, and the levels of trust
between members and their supervisory committee. 
However, it is also disappointing to see that the audit
committee research does not appear to cover these
types of issues to any great extent either. It is the hope
of the authors that this research will be the foundation
of more in-depth research in the future. Such research
is important as it helps those outside the credit union
and co-operative world to better understand these
unique and important organisations.
Notes
i The original legal framework for credit unions, the
Cooperative law (1868,1871) paragraph 38 (I)
stated ‘It is the task of the Supervisory Board
(Verwaltungsrat, Aufsichtsrat) to supervise the
Executive Board (Vorstand) in their management in
all branches of the administration…’ (cited in
Raiffeisen, 1970:55)
ii The English-Canadian credit union movement has
adopted the corporate model of the audit
committee which operates as a sub-committee of
the board rather than as an independent entity.
iii In the case of the credit unions, the members own
the organisation but they elect a board to run the
organisation on their behalf.  
iv The largest umbrella body for Irish credit unions.
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